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Abstract of thesis entitled: 
Flexible Contracts for Competitive Supply Chain under Mar-
ket Dynamics 
Submitted by WONG Chun-hung Eliphas 
for the degree of Master of Philosophy 
at The Chinese University of Hong Kong on September 24, 2007 
In the literature, we discuss the influence of decentralization 
and presence of spot market in supply chain management. The 
reason why the supply contracts in supply chain management 
becomes important will be revealed during the discussion. The 
effect of the presence of spot market to the supply system will 
be discussed. A short review on classical approach in analyzing 
i 
inventory systems will be given as well. In addition, we develop 
a inventory model and formulate the model whose procurement 
can make via both flexible supply contract and spot market. Fol-
lowing the classical approach, we analyze the formulation and 
rewritten it into a cardinal form. We decompose the optirnality 
equation into a set of optirnality equations and set up a two 
phase optimal policy: firstly optimizing the order via the spot 
market and secondly optimizing the order via the flexible supply 
contract. This first phase optimal policy is characterized by the 
order-up-to level and the two inventory levels derived from the 
setup cost. This is an optimal ordering and reselling policy. We 
call it (s, S, s') resemble to the classical (s, S) policy. Integrat-
ing it with the second phase optimal policy, we prove that the 
optirnality function is unirnodular. Finally, we present the idea 
and suggest an approach to optimize the multi-period dynamics 
ii 
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Inventory replenishment is a critical part in supply chain. In 
making a replenishment policy, there are several questions which 
are essential to answer: 
1. How often does the buyer procure? 
2. How much to pay when the buyer procurc? 
3. How much does it cost to procure? and 
4. From where does the buyer to procure? 
1 
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To answer the first question, the nature of the commodity is 
causal. For managerial reason, periodic reviewing the inventory 
level is usually used in refilling the demand which is seasonal 
sensitive. For other commodities which can be bought or sold 
through the internet, such as electric commodity industries, con-
tinuously review is possible and reasonable, their procurement 
order can be placed immediately when there is a need. 
The answer to the second question seems to be simply the 
cost of the product needed to procure. However, besides the 
cost of the products, whenever an order is placed it involves 
some other costs. For example, setup cost, transportation cost, 
etc. Different forms of the costs involved would induce differ-
ent procurement policies. Moreover, the cost of the products 
can vary over time, some of the commodities are seasonal and 
demand sensitive, some of them are information sensitive. The 
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factor would vary the cost of the products, thus the volatile cost 
poses the problem of timing in placing a procurement order in 
the decision making. 
Basically, it seems that we can only study the last two ques-
tions to find out the optimal policy for replenishing inventory. 
Classic inventory theory addresses the second last questions with 
different forms of functions to model the cost structure. Most 
of the different kinds of cost structures have been studied and 
general formulation of cost functions can be found in Hakdsoz 
and Seshadri [13 . 
One of the major policies was provided by the studies of Scarf 
and his followers. One of the advantages of the policy which 
Scarf developed is that it is easily traced and managed even the 
demand of the products at the period is unknown when using the 
(s, S) policy. The milestone in classical inventory theory is the 
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development of /C-convexity. The definition defines a new class 
of functions which have some common well-defined properties. 
The invention of this new class of functions extracts the criti-
cal phenomenon in inventory replenishment into a mathematical 
formulation. This makes the study of the K-convex functions 
become possible and easy. In other words, the i^-convex func-
tions in modeling the cost helps to handle the effect of setup cost, 
which had been the hardest difficulty whenever it occurred, in 
studying inventory model. Many scholars extended the class of 
cost functions after (s, S) policy. Their concerns focused on the 
form of the cost functions and of the demand density distribu-
tion. They imposed and relaxed different assumptions in order 
to extend and modify the class of cost functions in which the 
(s, S) policy can be applied. However, in classical inventory the-
ory, the studies didn't address the last question directly. All of 
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the studies to seemed have a common hidden assumption that 
there was only one source to replenish the inventory. Moreover, 
they assumed that there was only one form of procurement, a 
specified amount of procurement, besides different forms of cost 
structure. 
There have been two phenomenons triggering and motivating 
the development of supply chain management recently. The dif-
ferent degrees of decentralization of manufacturing motivate the 
development of supply contracts to coordinate execution among 
actions of the whole chain. Manufacturing decentralizes their 
supply chains into several parts and diverge them into different 
locations geographically. Furthermore, the ownerships of some 
actions among the chain are sold to other owners. Each firm 
has its objectives which may be different from the original one. 
Different kinds of supply contacts are designed to coordinate 
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the precise actions within the chain. Various forms of contracts 
which have never been discussed are now legally practicing and 
executing. These contracts are used for facilitating the perfor-
mance meanwhile achieving the firms' different objectives (Ca-
chon [6]). On the other hand, establishing spot market attracts 
supply chain manufacturers to reveal the potential benefit in 
participating in it. 
Researches have also shown that the development of spot 
market can improve the efficiency of designing supply contracts 
and trading in this financial market (Haksoz and Seshadri [13]). 
This trend in taking participation after the presence of spot 
market completes the spot market and makes it more efficient as 
a single financial system. Moreover, there are many possibilities 
in participating in the spot market that have not been revealed 
3^ et. One of the inborn natures of presence of spot market must 
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be inherited is the volatile spot price. However, this is not yet 
as mature as the share or the index markets to provide a futures 
market for trading standardized futures on the exchanges so 
that the participators can take position in this futures market 
to hedge their potential risk. 
Regardless the possibility of developing standardized com-
modities futures markets/ the lack of standardized futures pro-
vides no means for the spot market participators to immunize 
their spot market trading. This arouses the need of existence 
of other means to hedge the potential risk. The existence of 
different kinds of supply contacts becomes necessary. According 
to specific needs of different parts in the supply chain, most of 
the supply contracts designed do not inherit the standard fig-
ures of the derivatives traded in financial market. They develop 
^ The development of standardized futures market depends heavily on the nature and 
the trading tradition of the commodities. 
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their own characteristics to suit the needs of the contract writ-
ers. Most of these supply contracts are traded over-the-counter 
in nature. 
The emergence of the supply contract is not a new thing 
among researchers, the replenishing method assumed in classical 
inventory theory can be viewed as a particular class of supply 
contracts which is the simplest and the most natural one. In 
the words by Bassok and Anupindi [3], this kind of contracts 
specifies a per-unit purchase cost and ordering period. Even 
though these supply contracts are varied in form, consistently, 
they consist of common features that can be easily modeled. In 
contrast to the traditional supply contract, the newly developed 
supply contracts provide more flexibility to the underwriters in 
various ways. The supply contracts usually provide them with 
the flexibility on volume of purchasing and the contract commit-
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merit terms with non-fulfillment penalties. Some of the contracts 
would even provide flexibility on when to execute the contracts. 
However, the latter feature is not common among the contracts 
between suppliers and distributors in which they have long-term 
contracts commitment. 
The existing mathematical abstraction cannot fulfill the study 
on the emerging new features in supply chain analysis. There is 
a specific feature of the spot market which is completely different 
from the traditional replenishing channel. With the presence of 
the spot market, participator not only can buy but also sell their 
commodities through it. The traditional replenishment channel 
only provides participators with a one-way platform. However, 
the spot market provides a two-way one. There was a lack of 
literatures which study this kind of spot market nature to our 
knowledge. Existing literatures tells us that the mathematical 
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tool that we are using from Scarf till now has a difficulty in 
handling these new features. The /C-convexity can only handle 
the one-way buying formulation. There is a need to extend the 
current concept of /�-convexity to include the selling via any 
channel. 
In view of this trend in the presence of the spot market and 
coordinating different parts in supply chain via various supply 
contracts, there are far more answers to the last question. There 
are at least two more forms of procurement: via spot market and 
via supply contracts. However, the literature review shows little 
progress on replenishing the inventory via both channels. Most 
of the recent literatures only concentrate on one of these two 
channels related to inventory replenishment. More detail can 
be found in a comprehensive review by Haksoz and Seshadri 
13] and the work by Cachon [6]. The models developed accent 
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on the detail of the form of supply contracts. Some of them 
view it from the financial content perspective and they focus 
on the valuation methodology but rarely discuss the optimality 
strategies via these contracts. By the way, the focus of studies 
on the presence of the spot market diverges. The discussion 
varies from business-to-biisiness strategy to online procurement 
policies. Similarly, they seldom address the optimality strategies 
via the spccial nature of spot markets. Even there exists a few 
impressive studies, most of the results are either numerically 
discussed or heuristically presented. There is still an urge to 
study how to participate in both channels to optimize the benefit 
and the efficiency. 
In this literature, Chapter 2 presents the inventory model 
which discusses the inventory problem of replenishing their in-
ventory via both flexible supply contracts and spot market, 
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while participator of spot market can also sell their commodities 
through it. This model abstracts most of the important features 
which emerged recently, especially for those related to the last 
two questions. We will also discuss the relationship between the 
constraints and the optimality equation and decompose it into a 
set of optimality equations in cardinal form. The decomposition 
of the optimality equation is important for the analysis as we 
will see in the following chapter. 
After the problem formulation, in Chapter 3, based on the de-
composition of the optimality equation, we derive a two phase 
optimal policy to optimize the total expected cost. The first 
phase optimal policy resembles the classical (s, S) policy which 
we called the (s, 5", s') policy. This policy is an extension of 
the classical ( 5 , S) policy. The second phase optimal policy is 
derived based on the result of the (s, S, s') policy. And an inte-
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grated policy is reached. 
In the last chapter, we discuss the possibility and challenges 
of extending the two phase optimal policy in multi-period. In 
the chapter, we also summarize the main insights developed from 
this literature and provide some suggestions for future research. 
1.1 Literature Review 
Classical dynamic inventory analysis established by Scarf [21 . 
As stated above, it is quite sparse to find literature on optimal 
strategies with both supply contract and spot market consider-
ation in inventory model. A majority of the research on sup-
ply contracts deals with contracts valuation, which belongs to 
the line of work in finance. Nevertheless, Bassok and Anupindi 
3] derived the optimal policy in a given total minimum quan-
tity commitment contract and the effect of price discount. Li 
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and Koiivelis [16] provided a quantitative approach and Bassok, 
Bixby, Srinivasan and Wiesel [4] developed a heuristic approach 
based on an assumption that there are updating information and 
renegotiating opportunities to determine the optimal purchas-
ing quantities. Li and Kouvelis [16], reserved a lot of work on 
valuating supply contracts with risk-sharing features. Tsay [24 
studied the incentives of customer and supplier using quantity 
flexibility contract in his paper and investigated the behavior 
and performance of the supply chain. In comparing the long 
term and short term supply contracts, Cohen and Agrawal [10: 
and Bonser and Wu [5] provided analytic model to determine 
the tradeoff between these two kinds of contracts. The latter 
model provided by Bonser and Wu [5] is a linearized two phase 
model. 
The studies of spot markets inventory policies, Seifert, Thone-
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mann and Hausman [22] formulated a single period expectation-
variance model and concluded the significance of spot market. 
Some of the literatures used two-periods risk-neutral model to 
study this problem (cf. Haks5z and Seshadri [13]). Most of 
these models are static in nature. Two literatures which are 
the most closely related to what is discussing in this literature 
were given by Araman and Ozer [2] and Martinez-de-Albeniz 
and Simchi-Levi [18]. Araman and Ozer [2] studied the manu-
facturer's production and selling plan, they developed a compre-
hensive formulation in studying the selling allocation via both 
the long-term contracts and spot markets over a finite-horizon. 
On the other hand, Martinez-de-Albeniz and Simchi-Levi [18: 
studied the purchasing policies via both portfolio of contracts 
and spot market. Beyond these models, we consider that the 
buyer can participate in the spot to buy and sell in studying this 
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replenishment problem. This extends the model by Martinez-
de-Albeniz and Simchi-Levi [18 . 
The rest of this chapter gives a brief review of those mile-
stones inventory models and the tools those we are still using in 
studying the inventory theory. While some of the others recent 
developed models, especially on the topics about supply con-
tracts and the spot market, will not be focused here since those 
models can be referred to in several excellent reviews by Haksoz 
and Seshadri [13] and Cachon [6 . 
1.2 Convexity 
Classical inventory theory is established by Scarf [21] and his 
convexity. The optimality of (s, S) policies is shown to be 
optimal to the objective function which is neither convex nor 
concave. A general dynamic inventory model (a newsvendor 
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model) is presented firstly and then a short discussion on Scarf's 
(s, S) policies will be given. During the review, we would define 
a cardinal optimality equation form as well. 
1.2.1 The (s, 5)policy and cardinal optimality equation 
form 
Adapting the notation and formulation by Porteus [20], let us 
write down the objective equation of a dynamic inventory model 
below: 
ft{x) = + mill |Gi(x),min[/< + , (1.1) 
where we define 
noo 
Gt{y) = q/ + L{y) + /3 / ft+八y — (1.2) 
Jo 
where (3 is the period discount factor, ^ is the random variable 
of demand and define 
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In this section, K refers specifically to the setup cost or the total 
setup cost function. 
We define the cardinal optimality equation form as following: 
/ � = - e x + min{5f(y)}, (1.3) y 
where x is the initial inventory level, y is the inventory level after 
replenishment and g{y) is a cost function which is a recursive 
equation in dynamic problem and is a nonrecursive equation in 
single period problem. 
Scarf invented the notation of K-convex functions for the ex-
plicit purpose of analyzing this inventory model. Intrinsically, a 
function f is /(-convex if it lies below the line segment connect-
ing (x, f{x)) and {y,K-\- f{y)) for all x <y. Using the definition 
by Scarf, K-convexity is defined as below.^ In Figure 1.1, the 
2 Using definition by Gallego and Sethi [12], a function f is {Kq, KI,..., / (n) -convex or 
simply /C-convex if 
f{Xx + Xy) < Xf{x) +X[f{y) + K{y - x)], 
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function G{x) is a K-coiwex function and in the graph which 
shows a special case when K + f{S) — f{s). 
Definition 1.1 A function f is called K-convex if 
K + f{u + a ) > f{u) + ^[f{u) — f[u — h)] (1.4) 
for all u eR, a > 0 and b>0. 
Some useful properties for K-convex functions are now pre-
sented. 
Proposition 1.1 1. If f is K-convex and a is a positive scalar, 
then af is L-convex for all L > aK. 
2. The sum of a K-convex function and a L-convex function 
is {K + L)-convex function. 
71 
for all X <y and all A e [0,1], where 7 二 1 - and K(z) = KQ6{e7x) + KiS[Zi) which 
1=1 
is the total setup cost function. This definition is equivalent to the definition above when 
in one dimensional space. 
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( C 
V J 
Figure 1.1: Action of an (s, S) policy. 
3. If f is K-convex, (j) is the probability density function of a 
positive random variable, and 
Jo 
then F is K-convex also. 
4- If f is K-convex, x < y and f{x) = + f{y). 
Next, we defines the structure of (s, S) policies: there exist 
parameters s and S such that s < S and the policy a is called 
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a (s, S) policy if it orders up to level S when the stock level x 
is strictly below s and orders nothing elsewhere. That can be 
formulated as below by 
( 
S if X < s 
a{x) = (1.5) 
X otherwise. 
\ 
In Figure 1.2.1, it shows how the (s, S) policy responses to the 
inventory level. 
In 1960, Scarf showed in his literature that, The optimality 
of (S,s) policies in the dynamic inventory problem, this (s, S) 
policy is optimal to the dynamic inventory problem given at 
the beginning of this section. As shown in Figure 1.1, if G{x) 
is known, it easily determines the inventory level of s and the 
minimal level S through the setup cost K. The solid line on 
the figure shows the cost for the next period. Comprehensive 
presentation of the proofs and the description can be found in 
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Scarf [21] or Porteus [20\ 
The development of ( 5 , S) policy provides an easily traceable 
policy in the model even the demand is not exactly known. The 
explicit intension of studying a class of /(-convex functions in 
inventory problem inspires researchers to start to analyze the 
cost function structures directly. Although the model studied in 
that era could not predict the necessity of two-way trading plat-
form, the study of (s, S) policy and /^-convexity had important 
impact to the development of inventory theory in that era. 
There is another theorem that associates with the base stock 
policy in optimization on restricted range for order making. We 
give it as a theorem below. 
Theorem 1.1 (Karush, 1958) 
Suppose that / : R —^ R and f is convex on M. For y < z, define 
"(y’2；) = mill f{x) 
xe\y,z\ 
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then g can be expressed as 
g{y,z) = F{y) + G{z), 
where F is convex increasing and G is convex decreasing on M. 
Moreover, suppose S is a minimizer of f over R, then 




In view of the profound works in optimal policy analysis in 
inventory theory, it can be easily concluded that the classical 
inventory model formulation based on the single contract as-
sumption and developed on the buy only platform. To capture 
the newly emerge features existed in different parts of the sup-
ply chain, a new formulated model is needed in advance. We 
will give this model in the next chapter. This model is already 
simple enough but capture most of those important analytical 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 24 
features which we have discussed. 
Chapter 2 
Inventory Problem 
We consider a two-channel replenishing inventory problem which 
involves a flexible supply contract and spot market in this chap-
ter. The mechanism of these two channels and the replenishment 
procedure via these two channels will be presented here. We will 
analyze and present the optimal policy in single-period. 
25 
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2.1 Two-channel Inventory Model 
In the introduction, the necessity of studying multiple channels 
replenishment has been discussed. In light of the recent decen-
tralization of supply chain, the use of spot market and supply 
contract started to grow. Therefore, these two-channel will be 
our primary focus. The variety of supply contracts is numerous, 
different contracts have their specific characteristics. To develop 
a dynamic inventory model, we extract the important flexibility 
features among those various forms of contracts in the contract 
modeling. In modeling the presence of spot market, in order 
to keep the simplicity for analysis and consider the generality 
of the formulation, we would like to impose a linear cost with 
setup cost whenever there is participation in the spot market. 
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2.1.1 Model Formulation 
Consider a two-channel dynamic inventory model in single pe-
riod horizon. In the inventory system, the supplier can replen-
ish inventory from two-channel in every period. One channel 
is through the flexible supply contract and the other through 
the spot market. The two parties who underwrite the contract 
are the distributor (the buyer), who operates the system and 
the supplier (the seller). The flexible supply contract is charac-
terized by a (q, Q) pair, this pair specifies the range of replen-
ishment level in period t. At the beginning of the horizon, the 
distributor commits in the flexible contract with supplier to pro-
cure at least q but not more than Q at the unit purchasing price 
Pc. This per unit purchasing price is agreed in the contract when 
they underwrite the contract. During the decision horizon, the 
distributor does not have opportunity to renegotiate the terms 
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in the contract. At the beginning of every period, the distribu-
tor can adjust his inventory level through spot market channel 
to buy or sell the product from or to the spot market at spot 
price P with a single transaction fee K in any single trading/ 
this transaction fee generally is a commission for intermediators. 
We assume the order placement on spot market is placed at the 
beginning of the period. 
We assume the purchasing, holding and backlogged costs are 
stationary over time and proportional to their respective quan-
tities. We also assume that the supply lead time is zero. The 
distributor knows the distribution of the demand even he does 
not know the actual demand at the beginning of the period. We 
also assume the demand follows an independent and identical 
^This single transaction fee can be different between buying from and selling to the 
spot market. For simplicity, the discussion here only discuss the same buying and selling 
transaction cost. 
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probability distribution. 
The sequence of events and control actions taken by the dis-
tributor are described as follows: at the beginning of each pe-
riod, observe the initial inventory backorder from previous pe-
riod and observe the spot price from the spot market; place the 
order within the range of the contract commitment; observe the 
inventory after replenishment through contract and make order 
placement unto spot market; customer demand arrives and is 
satisfied as much as possible; excess demand is backlogged and 
the lost is calculated in the terminal function. 
The following notations are used throughout the analysis. 
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I initial inventory level 
X replenishment through flexible supply contract 
y replenishment through spot market, 
where y < 0 means that y units are 
withdrawn and sold to the spot market 
W collection of all admissible actions 
Pc unit cost through contract with supplier 
K setup cost when purchasing or selling through spot market 
p observed spot price during the period 
h+ unit holding cost 
h— unit shortage cost 
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^ realization of demand during the period 
(/){•) probability density function of demand per period 
<!>(•) cumulative function of demand per period 
L(-) expected holding and shortage cost 
/(/; X, y) total expected cost at stage I with decision variables [x, y) 
F{I) optimal cost function 
We use asterisk ( *) to denote optimal decision variables. 
The problem is formulated as dynamic programming model 
with leftover inventory level ( / ) and spot price (P) as the stage 
variables. The periodic purchasing quantities through contract 
(x) and those through the spot market (y) are the decision vari-
ables. The demand � is a random variable follows the known 
probability density function 
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The cost purchase via the flexible supply contract is given 
by the preset contract unit price Pc and the quantity purchased 
through the contract x; the contact unit price is agreed at the 
contract commitment and the quantity should fall into a range 
from q to Q. Therefore, the cost via contract during the period 
is given by 
{Pcx\q<x<Q}. (2.1) 
We denote a market setup cost for replenishment order y by 
KS{y) where y G R (2.2) 
where 6{y) = 1 when y ^ 0 and S{y) 二 0 when y is zero. Note 
that the function is homogeneous of order 0, that is for any 
aeR\{0},K{ay) = K{y).' 
An admissible action is denoted by w and the collection of 
^When the buying and selling setup cost are clifFerent, the market setup cost, function 
is denoted by 
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all admissible actions by W. Each element in this collection 
is represented by a pari of orders. In other words, w; is a pair 
of amounts such that each value represents the amount to pur-
chase via the flexible supply contract and via the spot market 
respectively, i.e. w — w e W ii x e [q, Q] and y e R 
is arbitrary, y < 0 means selling to the spot market and y > 0 
means buying from the spot market. 
The possible outcome of the demand f is in the range [0, oo), 
and it follows an independent identical probability density func-
tion This probability density function is known for each 
period and is assumed to be stable over the horizons. 
where K ~ is the setup cost for selling and K + is the setup cost for buying, 5—(..!_/) = 1 
when y < 0 and = 0 when y >0 while (5+(y) = 1 when y > 0 and 6+{y) = 0 when 
y<0. 
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2.2 The total expected cost and constraints 
The total expected cost in a single period is defined as follow: 
/(/; a;, y) = PcX + py + KS(y) + L(I + x + y), (2.3) 
where 
L � = r (z - 0 0 ( 0 炎 + h— r K — 稳 俄 ( 2 . 4 ) 
� = 0 J^=z 
is the loss function when inventory after decision is z. The loss 
function is assumed to be convex in z. 
The initial inventory level, I and the current spot price, p, 
are the stage variables. There are two decision variables, namely, 
the replenishment order via the flexible contract x, and the order 
via the spot market y. With the constraints specified by 2.1 and 
2.2, the optimality equation is defined as the following: 
m = mill jV.,x,y) (2.5) 
xe[q,Q],yeR 
= min \pcX -\-py + K6{y) + L{I -\-x + y)]. (2.6) 
xE[q,Qlym 
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Observe that there is a minimum fix purchasing amount via 
the flexible supply contract q�which is larger than 0 in our 
model. To find out the relation between a non-zero and a zero 
fix purchasing amount formulation, write the transformations 
X = Q-^- X^ (2.7) 
and 
1 = 1 - q , (2.8) 
therefore x G [0, q] and q — Q-q- Thus, the total expected cost 
function is rewritten as 
/(/; x, y) 二 J)人q + + K5{y) + L{I + x + y) 
= Pcg + /(/;无,2/), (2.9) 
and similarly the optimality equation is rewritten as 
F{I) = PcQ + mill f{i]x,y) 
+ 袖 . (2.10) 
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This shows that the addition of a non-zero fix purchasing amount 
transforms the initial inventory level, the range of the replen-
ishment amount via the flexible supply contract by q and the 
optimal value by a constant PcQ. 
Hence, it is equivalent to consider the non-zero and zero fix 
purchasing amount formulation. The relation between them is 
governed by the following set of transformations 
q = Q - q \ (2.11) 
x = x-q; (2.12) 
i=I + q] (2.13) 
where x G [0, (J] and 
f { i ; x , y ) = f m x , y ) - p c q (2.14) 
F { i ) = F( I ) - M . (2.15) 
For simplicity, in the following context, we consider the zero 
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fix purchasing amount formulation and omit the tilde sign on 
F(-), / and x, and we replace [0, q] by [0, Q . 
2.3 The optimality equation 
The total expected cost can be rewritten as 
/(/; X, y) =L(I + x + y)+p{I + x + y) + KS(y) 
- { p - p , ) x - p L (2.16) 
Define 
G{z) = L{z)-\-pz, (2.17) 
thus 
/(/; X, y) = G{I-i-x + y)^ K5[y) - {p - Pc)x - pL (2.18) 
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The optimality equation is rewritten as 
F(J) = i^in 
xe[0,Q],yeR 
= — p i + min -(p - Pc)x + min[G(/ + x + y) + KS(y)]. 
xe[0,Q] I yeR _ 
(2.19) 
The rewritten optimality equation shows that it is possible to 
decompose the optimality equation into two cardinal optimality 
equations, which separates the optimizing process of two deci-
sion variables. The original optimization is equivalent to firstly 
optimize the replenishment order via spot market y, then the 
order via the flexible supply contract x. 
Define a new optimality equation 
G*{u) = mm[L{u + y) ^ p{uy) + K6{y)' 
yeR 
= m i n [G(u + y) + K5{y)] . (2.20) 
yeR 
Denote 
G{I; x) = G*{I + x)-{p-pc)x, (2.21) 
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and define another new optimality equation as 
G\I) = min G(I;x). (2.22) 
Thus 
= ~ S � I ) - p L (2.23) 
Chapter 3 
The two phase optimal policy 
We have presented the two-channel replenishment inventory prob-
lem. The properties of the constraints and the total expected 
cost have been discussed, the optirnality equation is set up. We 
would like to derive the optimal policy for this problem in this 
chapter. 
40 
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3.1 Deviation of two phase optimal policy 
The supplier would like to find an integrated optimal policy for 
the replenishment order via the flexible supply contract and that 
via the spot market. The analysis of the optimality equation in 
section 2.1 shows that we can separate the optimal strategy into 
two phases. 
Let u = / + X be an inventory level after flexible supply 
contract replenishment. Restate the set of optimality equations 
as below: 
G*{u) = mm[G{u + y) + KS{y)] (3.1) 
G\I) = mill [G*(/ + x) - (p - pc；^ (3.2) 
a;e[0’Q] 
and 
F{I) = G\l)-pL (3.3) 
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Two phase optimal policy is described as follow: first phase is 
to optimize the equation G(u + y) + KS{y) through an optimal 
order decision via spot market y; then the second phase is to 
optimize the Eq.2.21 through another optimal order decision 
via flexible supply contract x. Note that the optimal function 
•* 
G {u) depends on the optimal function G*{u). Thus, the original 
optimal function F ( / , p ) which depends on the stage variables I 
and p is reached. 
3.1.1 First phase optimization - The (s, S, s') policy 
Suppose the supplier has made a replenishment order via flexible 
supply contract, the inventory level after replenishment is u. Wc 
want to find out the optimal ordering policy via the spot market. 
Define 5 to be a solution of 
f = 0. (3.4) 
dz 
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Since L{z) is assumed to be convex, then L{z) is convex in 
z also. Therefore S minimizes the function 
h{z) -{-pz. 
Denote s, s' G R, such that s < S < to be two inventory 
levels such that s satisfies 
L{s) +ps = L(S) -hpS + K, (3.5) 
and, satisfies 
L{s') + ps' = L(S) +pS + K. (3.6) 
Since the setup cost K exits only when there is real transac-
tion in the spot market, the optimality equation Eq.3.1 can be 
written as 
[ y/o J 
The first cost function in the blanket represents the cost when 
there is a zero spot market replenishment order; the second one 
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Figure 3.1: Determine the inventory levels s,S and s' and the optimal func-
tion G*{u). 
represents the cost when there is a non-zero order. 
Once the supplier makes replenishment order via the spot 
market, the minimal cost is 
G{S) + K. 
With the definition of s and s' and the convexity of G{z), for 
z < s and 2: > the following inequalities hold 
G{z)>G{s), (3.7) 
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and 
G{z) > G{s'). (3.8) 
This shows that the following ordering and reselling policy is 
optimal 
( 
0 \i s <u< s', 
y = (3.9) 
S — u otherwise, 
\ 
and the optimality cost is given by 
/ 
G(u) lis <u<s', 
G*{u) = (3.10) 
G{S) + K otherwise. 
、 
We observe that the optimal order policy via the spot market 
resembles the (s, S) policy. We call this policy as (s, 5, s') policy. 
The Figure 3.1 show us how to determine the three inventory 
levels s, S and s' and the optimal function G*(u). And Figure 
3.2 shows the action of the (s, 5, s') policy. 
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st 
( o 
Figure 3.2: The action of an (s, S, s') policy. 
3.1.2 Second phase optimization 
The replenishment order via the flexible supply contract x is 
distributor's decision variable so as to minimize the expected 
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cost: 
G{I;x) = G*{I-^-x)-{p-pc)x 
G{I + x) — { p - Pc)x if s - X < I < s' - X 
= < 
G{S) + K - {p - Pc)x otherwise, 
、 
(3.11) 
where x G [0,Q], 7 is the inventory level before ordering from 
flexible supply contract. 
Let u = I + x and note that du/dx = 1. Taking derivative of 
Eq.3.11 with respect to x and setting it to zero, ioi s < u < s' 
we get the following equations: 
dG du . 
丁 丁 -{P-Pc) = 0 
du ax 
^ - { P - P c ) = 0. (3.12) 
du 
Define Sp be a solution to the Eq.3.12 on u such that s < Sp < 
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i.e. 
dG , \ 
丁 =P-Pc- 3.13 
Observe that the geometric meaning of the solution Sp is the 
inventory level, on the interval (s, s') in Figure 2.1, at which the 
slope of its tangential line is equal to p — Pc-
If the spot price is greater than the contract price p > Pc, the 
slope of the tangential line is positive, then Sp is greater than 
S] if the spot price is smaller than the contract price p < Pc, the 
slope is negative, then Sp is smaller than S. If the spot price 
is equal to the contract price p = Pc, the expected cost G{I] x) 
degenerates to the function G*{u). The minimal inventory level 
S is the solution to the Eq.3.12, i.e. Sp = S. Any flexible supply 
contract order x is optimal for which satisfies the constraint 
X E [0, Q . 
It shows that the difference between the spot price and the 
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contract price determines the action of exercising the flexible 
supply contract. 
We discuss two different cases: when p > Pc and when p < Pc, 
so as to determine the optimal policy for the contract order. 
A. When p > Pc 
The slope defined by Eq.3.13 is positive. An increase on x by 
amount h would decrease the cost by —{p — Pc)h. Basically, the 
larger the contract order, the more to reduce in the cost. 
By the definition of Sp and the convexity of it is optimal 
to make flexible supply contract order up to Sp for s — x < I < 
s' — X. Since x should lies within the interval [0,Q]. When 
Sp — Q < I < Sp/it is optimal to take x = Sp — 1. 
When I < Sp-Q, 
dGdu . , 
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G(I; x) is decreasing in x. Note that in Figure 2.2, G{I] Q) lies 
below G{I] x) and G( / ,0 ) . Hence, it is optimal to order Q, the 
largest feasible amount in this interval. 
When I > Sp, we would like to take 
min|G( / ; 0 ) , min G{I;x),G{I;Q)\ . 
L 0<x<Q J 
Define 力 to be a solution to the following equation 
G{t) = G{S) + K-{p-pc)Q, 
such that s <t < Since G{u) is convex in u, there may be no 
solution or two solutions to the above equation. Let ti < S < t2 
be the two solutions when solution exists. By the definition of 
力2, for Sp < I < we have 
G{I) < G{S) + I〈一 {p - Pc)Q if / < 力2, 
G{I) > G{S) + K - { p - Pc)Q i f / > 仏 
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Figure 3.3: a. The optimality equation G*{I) when p > Pc and K > {p-pc)Q-
that is 
G( / ; 0 ) <G{I;Q) if / < (3.14) 
G{I]0) >G{I]Q) i f / � 力 2 . (3.15) 
Therefore, it is optimal to order zero for Sp < I < t2 and order 
Q for / > 力2. 
We conclude the above result as the following proposition: 
Proposition 3.1 When p > Pc, the following flexible supply 
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Figure 3.4: b. The optimality equation G*{I) when p > Pc and K > (p-Pc)Q-
contract replenishment order policy is optimal: 
Sp-1 ifSp-Q<I<Sp 
“ ifSp<I<t2 (3.16) 
Q otherwise, 
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Figure 3.5: The optirnality equation G*(I) when p > Pc and K < {p - Vc)Q-
and the minimal cost function is given by 
G{I + Q) - (p - Pc)Q ifs-Q<I<Sp-Q 
— G{S,)-{p-pc){S.p-I) ifS,-Q<I<Sp 
G\l) = (3.17) 
G{I) ifSp<I<t2 
G{S) + K — [p — Pc)Q otherwise. 
< 
Remark: U K < (jp — Pc)Q, it is optimal to order 
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Sp — I if Sp-Q< I <t 




t:G�S�— G�Sp — Q�+ K _ ^ 
“ P - P c 
B. When p < pc 
When p < Pc, the slope p — Pc is negative. Similar to the above 
analysis, when Sp — Q < I < Sp/\t is optimal to order up to the 
inventory level Sp via the flexible supply contract by x = Sp — I. 
When I > Sp, as in Figure 2.3, G( / ;0 ) lies below G{I;x) for 
X ^ 0. It is optimal to order nothing via the contract x = 0. 
When I < Sp — Q, define t be a solution to the following 
equation: 
G{t)-\-{pc-p)Q = G{S) + K 
such that s — Q<t<s' — Q, and let ti < S - Q < t2 be two 
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solutions when the solution exists. By the definition of ti, the 
following inequalities hold: 
G{I + Q) + (p, — p)Q > G{S) + X if / < 力1 
G{I + Q) + (Pc - P)Q < G{S) + K i f / > t i , 
that is 
> G( / ;0 ) if K h (3.18) 
G ( / ; Q ) < G( / ;0 ) if / > ti. (3.19) 
Therefore, it is optimal to order the maximal amount x = Q 
when ti < I < Sp — Q and order nothing cc 二 0 when I < t]_. 
We conclude the result as a proposition: 
Proposition 3.2 When p < Pc, the following flexible supply 
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Figure 3.6: a. The optimality equation G*{I) when p < Pc and K > (pc-p)Q-
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Figure 3.7: b. The optimality equation G*(I) when p < Pc and K > {pc-p)Q-
CHAPTER 3. THE TWO PHASE OPTIMAL POLICY 57 
contract replenishment order policy is optimal: 
Q ifti<I<S.p-Q 
^ = ^ Sp-I ifSp-Q<I<Sp (3.20) 
0 otherwise, 
\ 
and the optimality equation is 
G{I + Q) + {pc-p)Q tfti<I<Sp-Q 
_ G{S.p) + {Pc-p){Sp - I ) tfS.p-Q<I<S, 
G\I) = (3.21) 
G{I) ifSp<I<s' 
G{S) + K otherwise. 
v 
Remark: If K < {pc - _p)Q, it is optimal to order 
Sj,-I ift<I < S.丨) 
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Figure 3.8: The optimality equation when p < Pc and K < {jpc - p)Q. 
To conclude the above three cases, the two phase optimal 
policy is stated as following: 
Proposition 3.3 There exist inventory levels S, Sp, s, s' and 
t, 1 such that the following policy is optimal to the optimality 
equation Eq.3.3 
iWlicre 5 is a solution to G'{z) = 0; Sp is a solution to G'{u) 一（P — Pc) = 0; s and 
•s', where s < S < s', satisfy the equation G{u) = G{S) + K in u and when p > Pc t is a 
solution to 
G⑴+ ( p - = + …(1) 
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When p > Pc 
( 
- /)+ ifSp-Q<I<t 
X = (3.22) 
Q otherwise, 
\ f 
0 if s — Q < I < s' 
y = (3.23) 
S — I — Q otherwise. 
\ 
or 
G{S) + K-ip- Pc)Q = G{Sp -Q) + {p- Pc){t -S^ + Q) 
when (1) has no real solution; when p < pc t is a solution to 
G{t)-{p-p,) = G{S) + I< …� 
or 
G ( 5 ) + K = G{Sp) + (p - Pc){t - 5p) 
when (2) has no real solution. 
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When p < Pc 
f 
Q - (7 + Q - ift<I<Sp 
X = ( 3 . 2 4 ) 
0 otherwise, 
\ ( 
0 if s-Q < I <s' 
y = ( 3 . 2 5 ) 
S — I otherwise. 
\ 
When p = Pc 
X for any XQ G [ 0 , Q] ( 3 . 2 6 ) 
0 if S < I + Xq < 
y = ( 3 . 2 7 ) 
S — I — Xq otherwise. 
\ 
3.2 More about the optimal policy 
The minimal cost function Eq.3.2 as discussed above is unirnod-
ular. For I G {t, Sp) or / G {Sp,t) the minimal cost function 
G ( / ) is convex; and for I < t or I < Sp - Q and I > t or 
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/ > 5p, the minimal cost function is constant. 
There are two factors influencing the optimal policy: 1) the 
difference between the spot price and the contract price p — Pc 
and 2) the contract largest feasible amount Q. Note that their 
product {p — pc)Q is the term which reduces or increases the 
optimal cost F{I). 
When the spot price is greater than the contract price p � p � 
the optimal policy shows that this is optimal to order as much 
as possible even the initial inventory level is high already via the 
flexible supply contract. The excess inventory is then resold to 
the spot market with a beneficial amount {p — Pc){S — I — Q)— 
K. This strategy makes use of the flexible supply contract to 
speculate on the spot market. 
One the other hand, when the spot price is smaller than the 
contract price p < Pc, the optimal policy suggests the distributor 
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to order as little as possible via the flexible supply contract 
and to order the necessary amount via the spot market. This 
strategy resembles the use of a call options in financial market. 
The commitment of the flexible supply contracts serves as a 
hedging derive for the distributor to reduce his risk against the 
volatile spot price. 
In other words, when there is different between the spot price 
and the contract price, surely according to the “Buy Low; Sell 
High” principle in financial market, the optimal choice to make 
the replenished inventory level to the minimal level with the 
lower total cost. 
The above description shows that the use of a flexible sup-
ply contract resembles that of a vanilla options. Therefore, the 
flexible supply contract can be duplicated by a portfolio of op-
tions. However, a standard options provides distributor with a 
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fixed exercise price and a fixed amount to order. The flexible 
supply contract provides distributor with a range of amount to 
order with a fixed exercise price. The range of amount allows 
the distributor to reach his optimal replenishing inventory level 
which is not fixed. 
Chapter 4 
Further discussion and 
conclusion 
The analysis of the single period model provides us an optimal 
policy procedure to optimize the two-channel inventory prob-
lem. However, whether this procedure can be extended to multi-
period has not yet been discussed. We will give a discussion 
about this in this chapter. 
64 
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4.1 Multi-period problem 
4.1.1 Model formulation 
The following addition notations are used in the multi-period 
problem. 
f3 one period discount factor 
Dt demand at period t 
Wt an admissible sequence of actions at period t 
W[t, T] a collection of all admissible actions from period t to T 
J, ( / ,p ) an optimal total expected cost function at period t 
Where Wi is a sequence of pair of order values from period 
t to period T i.e. Wt = {(:r,y)i}/=亡.Initial inventory level 
and spot price pt at period t are stage variables, the spot price 
follows a stochastic process and 
It+i = It + x + y-Dt. (4.1) 
CHAPTER 4. FURTHER DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 66 
We use the convention that the period subscript of stage vari-
ables mentioned in optirnality equation are the same as that of 
the optirnality equation. 
The optirnality equation is 




( 4 . 2 ) 
Let = If. X + y he the inventory level after replenishment, 
and rewrite the optirnality equation 
J/(/,p) = -pi + mill [ - ( p - pc)x + + PcZ工” 
. xe[0,Q(] yeR 
poo 
+ Liz"^')+p / 入 — e ， P ) 树 f ) 敌 ] ] , 
Jo 
( 4 . 3 ) 
where Jt+i{I,p) = vr{I + oc + y — D,p) is a terminal value 
function, and 
noo 
MI.P) = F{Ir,pr) + f3 m i n / M 严 ' — 树 坎， 
WTeW[r,T] JQ 
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where F{It,Pt) 二 F[It) is the same as the optimality equation 
Eq.3.3, which depends on the stage variables It and pr-
4.1.2 The challenges in extending the optimal policy 
Observe that Eq.4.3 processes two minimizations with respect 
to X G [0, Qt] and yeR. We suspect that there is an extended 
form of two phase optimal policy which is optimal to the multi-
period problem. 
However, there are several challenges in justifying the above 
claim. Note that in single period, the cost function in the last 
period T processes a sum of a linear function PcX + py and a 
convex function L{z). However, the optimal function F{It,Pt) 
is not convex, thus, the expected value of last period optimal 
total cost function over the demand 
roo 
Jo 
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is not guaranteed to be convex. Hence, we cannot directly apply 
the technique in proving the optimality of the two phase optimal 
policy the dynamic optimization to the previous period T — 1. 
If the optimality equation Jt+八I,p) and the demand prob-
ability density function satisfy certain properties, which 
are still unclassified, so that the last integration in the optimal 
dynamic equation 4.3 preserves the stated property, then the 
optimality of the extended two phase optimal policy is believed 
to be optimal in multi-period also. 
The above discussion provides us with an idea of how to ex-
tend the current single period optimal policy to a multi-period 
optimal policy. The challenge is that the desire properties for 
the optimal dynamic equation and the demand probability den-
sity function is sill unknown. 
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4.2 Conclusion 
In this literature, we have discussed the influences of decen-
tralization in supply chain. The decentralization does not only 
bring about the resembling and assembling in supply system, 
but also injects a lot of the new issues that have not been ex-
pected and studied before. These issues induced lots of needs 
and opportunities. Two key results induced in the discussion 
can be concluded as below: 
1. emergence of various supply contracts; 
2. potential opportunity in the presence of spot market. 
The above phenomenon experienced during the past decade 
in supply chain management was studied in a separated con-
sideration. Lack of literature considered them as an integrated 
issue until recent work by Martmez-de-Albeniz and Simchi-Levi 
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18] and Araman and Ozer [2]. Therefore, we introduce a sup-
ply contract and spot market replenishment integrated inven-
tory model to study them in a single model formulation. We 
use flexible quantity contract and consider both selling and pur-
chasing through the spot market in our model, which is different 
from previous studies that assume the participator to purchase 
through the spot market only. 
The structure of the policy illustrates the value of existence 
of spot market, especially the opportunity on selling via the spot 
market. In traditional inventory theory, this is only allowed to 
purchase via spot market, the optimal policies always stated that 
the advantage of taking no action. However, since the presence 
of spot market, selling via it become possible, even the leftover 
inventory level is not less than a particular inventory level, the 
possibility of selling via spot market provides them with another 
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option to take arbitrate in it, that is to buy a certain amount via 
the contract and sell it via the spot market to take the potential 
benefit. The existence of the policy does not tell the violation 
of No Arbitrate Theorem, however, this may be based on the 
nature of lack of standardization of the newly developing spot 
market so that there is a lack of hedging financial method, such 
as futures on exchanges. 
When this phenomenon occurs, there is another question 
about this phenomenon. Will this situation continue as the spot 
market and the supply contract develop? We have no conclusive 
answer here. However, the underlying difference in the nature 
of commodity market and financial market may give us an in-
sight about this question. In supply chain system, almost all of 
the commodities traded among the market is tangible, will be 
exhausted one day in the future and they usually require lots 
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of space for storage and the transferral of ownership requires 
geographic transportation. While those traded in financial mar-
ket are "less" tangible, they usually are contracts which can be 
stored easily. They will not exhausted unless the bankruptcy of 
the films or damaging of the contracts occurs, besides the own-
ership transferral of the contract is easy and fast. Therefore, 
the requirement for the development of a complete and efficient 
commodity market is difficult to fulfill. The existence of supply 
contract would potentially provide a mean to hedge the risk they 
may face. Besides, it also provides inspiration on how to set the 
flexible quantity range of the contract in a more reasonable way. 
In our formulation, we also assumed a convex expected lost 
function L(-). Generally, for non-convex expected lost function, 
the studies are still open. 
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The other extension can be noted that, the parameters in the 
flexible quantity contract are preset and non-decisional. This 
assumption simplifies our discussion on the optimality policy. 
Founded on this model and the distributor optimal policy, the 
release of these parameters in the flexible quantity contract to 
decisional variables and the additional consideration on the sup-
plier side can help to find the equilibrium contract policy for 
both contract participators. 
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